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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Degree:

Application of HFACS (The Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System) to the Korean domestic
passenger ship accidents

MSc

This dissertation aims to review the passenger ship safety in Korea by identifying
human error causal factor in the investigation reports.
Although more than 80% of the causes of marine casualties reported as human error,
research and application of human factors are still insufficient compared to the
development of marine technology. The sinking accident of Sewol ferry that left 304
casualties is also an accident that is caused by a combination of various human errors
such as cargo overload, cargo securing faulty, and inappropriate maneuvering. In
order to prevent the further passenger ship accident, there is an urgent need to
address the safety problems caused by human error.
The paper reviewed the 30 accidents investigation reports of Korean domestic
passenger ship from 2014 to 2015. A total of 96 contributing factors were obtained
from the accident reports, and classified under the category of Marine HFACS
framework, which consists of three levels: organisational influences, precondition for
unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. The Marine HFACS analysis identified the relationships
between contributing factors of each level and the accident type of machinery failure,
grounding, flooding, contact, and collision.
The finding from this study reveals that the preponderant contributory factor to the
passenger ship accident was identified, and specific causal factors need further
development. Additionally, the understanding of the accident trend through the causal
relationship analysis assists to take measures to prevent the recurrence of the
accident.
KEYWORDS: Domestic passenger ship, Human error, HFACS, Maritime-HFACS
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background

The maritime safety is probably the most significant object in the shipping industry,
particularly in the passenger shipping sector due to its unique characteristics that
need more attention for safety. It is notable that the global ferry industry transports
about 2.1 billion passengers per year and ferry transportation is important to millions
of people as part of their daily lives (DNV-GL, 2016). However, world accident rate for
passenger ship still stays the certain level indicating red signal, while the passenger
shipping sector has been enlarged their portion among shipping industry each year
(EMSA, 2016). As the passenger ship is engaged in the service business, the
satisfaction of passenger could be the priority consideration to the passenger shipping
company. For this reason, despite difficult circumstance such as heavy weather, the
passenger ship could be forced to entry/departure. Especially the domestic passenger
ferry does not make sure of enough time for maintenance of equipment due to the
frequent entry/departure. Nevertheless, since the passenger ship is carrying dozens
and thousands of people, the severity of accidents is so great that it is natural to pay
more attention to the passenger ship safety.
International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is established for the purpose of
maritime safety, is also making efforts for safer shipping and marine environmental
protection through enacting mandatory instruments. They have adopted the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) after the catastrophe
of passenger ship Titanic in 1912. Apart from the development of technical regulations,
the loss of the Herald of Free Enterprise brought about the approach to the human
element as the cause of accidents and resulted in the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code which was made compulsory throughout the 1974 SOLAS

in 1998, by stipulating international standards for the safety management system of
shipping company for the safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention.
Recently, the world has been alerted once again about the safety of passenger ships
as a result of the Costa Concordia accident and the Sewol accident. However, there
are still many serious and minor passenger ship accidents over the world due to lack
of fundamental risk reduction or measures to diminish. On 16 August 2013, a rollon/roll-off ferry called St. Thomas Aquinas collided with a cargo ship near the southern
Philippine island of Mindanao mainly caused by the human error of the Captain. On 1
June 2015, the 76-meter-long passenger ship called Dong Fang Zhi Xing capsized
and sank on the Yangtze River in the Wuhan, China. Total 442 deaths were confirmed
and 12 rescued after the accident. The cause of the accident was the massive
downburst in the thunderstorm and ignorance of weather precautions by Captain of
the ship.
The aftermath of the Sewol accident, the Government of Republic of Korea has
focused on improving ship particulars (e.g., Limit of ship’s age and alteration) and the
reliability of maritime safety system, but the accident rate is continuously increasing.
The vessels that had been in the accident, excluding fishing vessels, were 562 ships
in 2010 yet, they increased to 741 ships in 2015, especially for the passenger ships,
the number of accident vessels has tripled, accounting for 66 ships in 2015 compared
to 2010 (KMST, 2016).
In that case, why we could not considerably reduce the risk of accidents, despite all
these improvements. Rothblum (2000) noted the reason is that ship particulars and
safety system reliability are a relatively small part of the safety equation. As the
maritime safety system is constructed by the human, the failure in the safety system
would be a human error, not a mechanical error. The numerous studies also clarify
that human error contributes to 80 - 96% of the accident (Aas, 2008; Rasmussen,
1997; Rothblum, 2000). Therefore, it is important that to understand in detail about
human error causal factors contributing to the previous accidents in order to set the
appropriate controls in place (Madigan, Golightly & Madders, 2016).
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Based on Reason’s (2000) study, the human error problem can be viewed in two ways:
the person approach and the system approach. The person approach concentrates
on the unsafe behaviour such as negligence, moral weakness, and violence. The
countermeasures considered as reducing unwanted variability in human behaviour.
The system approach focuses on the condition of an individual workplace and the
organizational process and human errors consider as not a cause but a result of
accidents. The countermeasure is the system defence. When an accident happened,
the point is to find out why and how the system has a failure.

The Sewol sinking accident, which has been entangled not only by the negligence of
the crew but also by the company organisation and the absurdity of the social system,
has led to the vibrant discussion and study about the systematic approach to the
marine accident. The Korean maritime industry recognized the importance of
organisational system and is actively studying the organisational factor that affects
the work environment of the ship rather than the simple mistake of the seafarers (Baik,
Park, Choi, & Oh, 2016; Kim, 2015; Yoon, 2014).

However, while the unsafe act of workers can be found out easily through the personal
approach, the deficiencies of organisational procedure often hidden beneath the main
factor. Reason (1990a) distinguished these two kinds of error: active errors and latent
errors. Active errors, whose consequences are revealed almost immediately, but
latent failures may lie dormant within the system for a long time. Although the workers
frequently may make some errors in the process of recovering the failure of the
system, the root cause of an accident has been laid in the system before the active
errors were executed.

For this reason, it is important for the accident investigators to find out all contributing
factors not only active errors but also latent factors laid in concealments within the
organisational system. By eliminating the error causes identified thorough accident
investigations, it is necessary to prevent repeated occurrences of the same disasters,
prevent similar accidents in the future, and improve safety management and safety
systems. On the contrary, insufficient accident investigation reports can lead to the
wrong lessons by committing errors during the process of cause analysing and by

３

failing to identify underlying causes of accidents, which can be a threat to the safety
system. Therefore, a study of analysis of the active failures and latent failures
contained in the existing investigation reports may be significant in identifying the
human error causal factors and it could be the unique opportunity to review the quality
and the depth of information of the accident investigation report.

1.2. Objectives

In order to analyse the human error causal factors on the passenger ship accident
investigation reports, this paper presents an application of the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework. The purpose of this study to
distinguish the active failure and latent failures on the accident reports, and to analyse
the prevailing factor and accident trend. By analysing the accident pattern, this paper
provides the recommendations for diminishing human error on the passenger ship.
Linked to this, the paper will find answers to the following questions.
i) Is the HFACS tool effective to identify the active errors and latent failures in the
organisational system on the accident investigation reports?
ii) Are there any differences within causal factors according to the different
categories of accident and is it possible to identify the accident mechanism?
iii) Do the accident investigation reports contain sufficient information in order to
identify the latent conditions?

1.3. Scope of work

This paper concentrates on the actual and latent factors that threaten the safety of
passenger ship. For this purpose, it utilises 30 cases of passenger ship accident
investigation reports in Korea during the period of 2014-2015. These investigation
reports are obtained from the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST). This paper
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will study the method of analysis of the human factors that have been investigated in
various industrial fields up to now and the model to analyse the cause of the accident
through this analysis methodology. The utility of the HFACS selected by the
methodology of this study will also be verified by the process of analysis of
investigation reports. The contents of each chapter are as follows.

Chapter 1 presents the motivation to study the actual and latent factors that contribute
to the passenger ship accident. It informs the seriousness of passenger ship accident
and highlights that the exact identification of causal factors by a thorough analysis of
accident can detect the underlying factors and prevent the recurrence of the same or
similar accident in the future. To clarify this, the aim and direction of this study are
presented.

Chapter 2 describes the status of Korean domestic passenger ship transport and
maritime accidents. It will clarify the definition and division of passenger ships defined
by the Korean domestic law and explain the present condition of domestic passenger
ships and operator. Further to this, based on statistics of marine accidents, it will
examine the current situation and causes of accidents.

Chapter 3 reviews the previous different theories and researches about human errors
and accident causation models. Among the human factor analysis methodologies, the
general concept of HFACS and Maritime HFACS selected as the main model for this
study will be introduced in detail.

Chapter 4 provides the information about the methodology of this study. It describes
the database of passenger ship accident investigation reports collected for this study,
and how to classify the identified contributing factors in these accidents and integrate
these factors into categories of HFACS framework.

Chapter 5 covers the results from the analysis of accident investigation reports based
on the HFACS framework. It reviews the outcomes of the analysis to see if we can
find the answers to the questions proposed in the Objectives and discuss the
implications of these results, including the limitation of this study.

５

Lastly, chapter 6 presents the conclusion of this study based on the analysis of
HFACS

framework.

In

addition,

recommendations

regarding

the

accident

investigation reports will be given for the improvement of passenger ship safety.

６

2. Passenger ship transport and status of maritime accidents

2.1. Passenger ship transport

2.1.1. Concept and classification of passenger ship

(1) Concept of passenger ship

According to the Korean Ship Safety Act, Article 2 (Definition), passenger ship has
defined a ship designed specifically to transport 13 fare-paying passengers or more.
More precisely, the term of passengers means “persons on board a ship, except the
following persons: (a) Crew; (b) An infant under one year of age; (c) A person
prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, who is temporarily
on board, such as a customs officer”. Passenger ships defined in this way are the
vessel used in “marine passenger transportation services”, and it is necessary to
clarify the range of passenger ships used in this study by looking at the concept and
kind of maritime passenger transport business.
In the Korean Maritime Transport Act, Article 2 (Definition), "marine passenger
transportation services means such business as transporting passengers or
passengers and goods by any passenger ship or any wing-in-ground ship as defined
in Article 1-2 (1) 1 of the Ship Act (hereinafter referred to as "passenger ship, etc.")
on the sea or along inland waterways contiguous to the sea or such business as
providing ancillary services to the former, which refers to any business other than
harbour transport-related business as prescribed in Article 2 (4) of the Harbour
Transport Business Act”.

７

Furthermore, in the Maritime Transport Act, Article 3 (Categories of Services), Marine
passenger transportation services is classified into the following categories: i)
Scheduled coastal passenger transportation services, ii) Non-scheduled coastal
passenger transportation services, iii) Scheduled overseas passenger transportation
services, iv) Non-scheduled overseas passenger transportation services, v) Cruise
passenger

transportation

services,

and

vi)

Combined

marine

passenger

transportation services.

Among the above-mentioned marine passenger transportation services, the vessels
used for “Scheduled coastal passenger transportation services” and “Non-scheduled
coastal passenger transportation services” are generally referred to as “Domestic
passenger ships.” In this study, domestic passenger ships will be targeted, and this
will be abbreviated as passenger ships.

(2) Classification of Passenger Ship

The purpose of the stipulation and classification of passenger ship in the regulations
such as Ship Safety Act is that to guide, supervise and regulate the passenger ships
which are required to secure the safety of passengers’ lives compared to the cargo
ships.

Passenger ships can be further classified as shown below, based on speed or type of
transport. Firstly, the passenger ship that utilized only for the purpose of
accommodating passengers and not carrying cargo or vehicles. Passenger ships are
subdivided again based on their speeds as follows1 (Park, 2015).

i) General Ship: Passenger ship with a speed of fewer than 15 knots
ii) High-Speed Craft: Passenger ship with a speed of more than 15 knots and less
than 20 knots
Definitions for classifying passenger ships by speed or type are not prescribed by Korean national
law. However, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries divides passenger ships on the basis of speed, etc.
in “the regulations on the notification of rates and fares for domestic passenger ship” issued based on
the Marine Transport Act, and specifies separate fares.
1
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iii) Super Speed Craft: Passenger ship with a speed of more than 20 knots and
less than 35 knots
iv) Super High-Speed Craft: Passenger ship with a speed of 35 knots or more

Secondly, cargo ferry that in addition to transporting passengers are also utilized to
carry vehicles from one destination to another. Cargo ferry is divided into Enclosed
Ro-Pax and Opened Ro-Pax depending on the type of ship (MOAF, 2015b).

i) Enclosed Ro-Pax (Roll-on Roll-off Passenger) means a car ferry that can load
or carry a vehicle in the enclosed vehicle area as it is used for land
transportation.
ii) Opened Ro-Pax means a car ferry that can load or carry a vehicle in the opened
vehicle area as it is used for land transportation.

Figure 2-1. Enclosed Ro-Pax (Left) and Opened Ro-Pax (Right)

Most of the passenger ships in Korea correspond to such transportation ships as
above, but there is another type of passenger ship, cruise ships. Thirdly, the cruise
ship is a passenger ship with convenient facilities such as accommodation, food and
beverage facilities, amusement facilities and so on. Passengers on cruise ships will
give great significance to the boarding per se, but in the case of marine passenger
transportation, the main purpose of the vessel is to be used as a means of physical
transport for passenger, so that this study will focus on the function and system of
transportation for the passenger.
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2.1.2. Status of passenger ship transport

(1) Status of passenger ship operators

As of the end of 2016, there is total 58 passenger ship service operators, managing
167 passenger ships, committing 108 service routes in the coastal of Korea. Figure
2-2 shows the presence of service routes of the domestic passenger ship, and Table
2-1 presents the number of service lines and operating vessels over the past three
years. Among the 108 routes, there are 81 general lines operated by the operators as
profitability is secured, and 27 subsidized lines2 that are supported as a semi-public
system by the government due to the lack of profitability. Compared to the record in
2014, while the service route increased by 13 routes on 95 routes, one operating ship
decreased. This can attribute to an increase in the number of operation required per
vessel.

Table 2-1. Number of service lines and operating vessels (KSA, 2017)
Number of Lines

Number of Vessels

Number
of
Company

Total

General
Lines

Subsidized
Lines

Total

General
Lines

Subsidized
Lines

2016

108

81

27

167

140

27

67(58)*

2015

112

85

27

169

143

26

69(60)

2014

95

69

26

168

142

26

69(62)

Note: * exclude duplicated company

A subsidized line means a route which receives government aid for the operating loss. In
case of small island area, due to the absolute shortage of passengers and low fares, shipping
operators are avoiding the operation of passenger ships. In order to provide transportation
convenience for those residents, the government orders the ship to be operated, and support
subsidy to the shipping operators.
2
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Figure 2-2. Service routes of Korean domestic passenger ship (KSA, 2017)

For the subsidized lines, however, since the government supports the deficit of
operation, the operators tend to neglect effort to improve their balance and service
quality. Furthermore, unlike international passenger transport service operators,
domestic passenger transport service operators are relatively small-scale company
and low profitable (Kang, 2016).

According to the report of KSA (2017), 8 of the 58 domestic passenger transport
service operators with less than 300 million won in the capital amount to 13.8% of the
total. Figure 2-3 shows that the number of operators per capital amount, and Figure
2-4 describes the number of operators per possessing number of vessels. The
number of operators with less than a billion won ($ 900,000) in capital is 32,
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accounting for 55.2% of the total, and the number of companies operated by one or
two vessels is 32, accounting for 55% of the total. For this reason, the plowback for
the ship safety management is so small that it is difficult to assure the passenger ship
safety.

Figure 2-3. Number of operators by capital amounts (KSA, 2017)
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Figure 2-4. Number of operators by passenger ship retention (KSA, 2017)
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(2) Status of Passenger Ship

As seen in Figure 2-5, the ratio of passenger ships with more than 20 years of age
was 14% in 2011 but increased to 27% in 2016. In terms of the number of vessels,
the total number of vessels in 2011 and 2016 was same as 167, while the number of
vessels with more than 20 years doubled from 23 to 46 vessels.

１２

In addition, there are seven vessels over 25 years of age in 2016 since the maximum
age of passenger ships has increased from 20 year to 30 year with the amendment
of the Enforcement Regulations for Shipping Act in 2009. The regulation for the age
of ship amended once again after the Sewol accident in 2014 by reducing the shipyear standard for cargo ferry from 30 year to 25 year. However, the ship-year standard
for passenger ship only for passenger has been maintained the 30 year (KMST, 2016).

Figure 2-5. Number of passenger ship per ship year (KSA, 2017)

2016

46

2015

23

31

2014

21

26
0

29

16
20

25

Ship year

60

<5

6-10

39

37

32
40

27

46

52
80

11-15

7

36

100

120

16-20

20-25

140

5
6
160

180

>25

According to a result of the study (KMIFT, 2008), the passenger ship’s age is not
related to the occurrence of the maritime accident, especially machinery failure.
However, the higher the ship’s age, the more it is to affect the normal operation of the
safety device, such as an emergency stop device. Also, due to vibration of hull, there
is a high possibility of fire onboard caused by damage of fuel oil and lubricating oil of
piping system. Therefore, the ship safety can be maintained at a considerable level
when strengthening the ship management system and investing in maintenance and
repair of the machine.

In terms of the number of passengers of ships in Korea, Figure 2-6 shows the trend
of utilization ratio of passenger ship since 2011. 16 million passengers used the
passenger ship in 2013 before the Sewol accident, and 14 million passengers in 2014
and then slightly increased to 15.4 million as of the end of 2016. Looking at the
average usage rate over the past five years, it shows an increase of 1.9%. Among
them, general users (except island area resident) are 76% of the total passengers,
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which is 11.7 million. It means that more than one-third of the whole population is onboarding passenger ships at least once a year (KSA, 2017).

Figure 2-6. Number of passengers per year (KSA, 2017)
Unit: Persons
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Regarding the proportion by the type of passenger as shown in Figure 2-7, opened
Ro-Pax occupied more than half of the total. The ratio increased from 54% in 2011 to
61% in 2016, accounting for 90 and 102 vessels, respectably. Following this, 21
General Passenger Ships (13%), 16 Super High Speed Craft (10%), 8 Super Speed
Craft (5%), and 5 High Speed Craft (3%) formed, as of the end of 2016. The proportion
of passengers by ship type showed a similar pattern according to the ratio of ship type,
with the highest rank of nearly nine million passengers on Opened Ro-Pax (KSA,
2017).
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Figure 2-7. Number of passengers and passenger ships by ship type (KSA, 2017)

(3) Status of Seafarers on Passenger Ship
As of the end of 2016, 824 seafarers are working on passenger ships. As described
in Table 2-2 below, the number of seafarers has increased steadily from 751 in 2005
to 988 in 2013, but it dropped to 774 in 2014 and then increased again. Out of 824
seafarers as of 2016, officers account for a high proportion of 565 people (68.6%), of
which the ratio of deck and engine officer is similar. In the case of ratings, the crew
belonging to deck section accounts for 73.4%. Especially, among the 167 passenger
ships, the small ship less than 500 tons occupies the majority with 139 vessels.
Table 2-2. Number of seafarers engaging in domestic passenger ships (Korea Seafarer’s
Welfare and Employment Center (KOSWEC), 2017)
Year

Officers

Grand

Ratings

Total

Total

Deck

Engine

Total

Deck

Engine

Cook

2016

824

565

314

251

259

190

64

5

2015

765

544

298

246

221

165

48

8

2014

774

560

309

251

214

163

48

3

2013

988

699

383

316

289

196

72

21
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2005

751

499

275

224

252

149

94

9

According to the statistics of the KOSWEC as shown in Table 2-3, there are currently
167 passenger ships, and with an average of 4.9 seafarers per ship. Compared to
other vessels, the number of passenger ship seafarers per ship is rather smaller than
that of 8.8 persons for the chemical tanker, 8.2 persons for LPG carriers, 6.4 persons
for the general cargo vessel, and 5.1 persons for oil tankers. In addition, the number
of passenger ship seafarers is much lower than that of 14.8 persons per ocean-going
passenger ship. It can be seen that a few seafarers on domestic passenger ships are
in a harsh working condition compared to other domestic ship types and ocean-going
passenger ships.

Table 2-3. Average number of seafarers on domestic vessels (KOSWEC, 2017)
Ship Type

Vessels

Seafarers

Seafarers
per vessel

Chemical Tanker

46

404

8.8

LPG

15

123

8.2

General Cargo Vessel

201

1293

6.4

Oil Tanker

168

862

5.1

Bunker Supply Vessel

64

227

3.5

Domestic Passenger Ship

167

824

4.9

Ocean-going Passenger Ship

8

119

14.8

The aging of the seafarers can also be a threat to passenger ships. As described in
the following Table 2-4 of the age range of seafarers on the domestic vessels, while
25.5% of those over 50 years old and 51.9% of those over 60 years old, only 5.4%
are under 30 years old. However, compared to year of 2010, the younger-than-25year-old seafarers have increased from 2.0% to 2.4%. The proportion of elderly
seafarers has increased compared with young seafarers. Regarding the age of
seafarers, as older group over the age of 60 will soon be out of ship operation, it is
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urgent to foster and provide the young seafarers to have a positive effect for the
maritime field.

Table 2-4. Status of seafarers’ age group on domestic ships (KOSWEC, 2017)

2010

2016

< 25

25-29

30-39

40-49

50-59

>60

Total

Total

166

138

521

1071

3,073

3,093

8,062

Ratio

2.0

1.7

6.4

13.3

38.1

38.3

100.0

Total

189

239

521

821

2,006

4,078

7,854

Ratio

2.4

3.0

6.6

10.5

25.5

51.9

100.0
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2.2. Status of Maritime Accident

2.2.1 Definition and kind of marine accident

(1) Definition of marine accident

According to the Annex of IMO Res. A. 884(21), Article 4 (Definition), Marine casualty
means “an event, or a sequence of events, that has resulted in any of the following
which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship:
(a) the death of, or serious injury to, a person;
(b) the loss of a person from a ship;
(c) the loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship;
(d) material damage to a ship;
(e) the stranding or disabling of a ship, or the involvement of a ship in a collision;
(f) material damage to marine infrastructure external to a ship, that could seriously
endanger the safety of the ship, another ship or an individual; or
(g)

severe damage to the environment, or the potential for severe damage to the
environment, brought about by the damage of a ship or ships” (IMO, 1999).

When we look at the Korean Act on the Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine
Accidents Article 2 (Definitions), the term of marine accident means “any of the
following accidents, which happen at sea and in the inland waters:
(a) An accident in which a person dies, disappears or is injured, in connection with
the structure, equipment or operation of ships;
(b) An accident which causes damage to a ship or shore or marine facilities, in
connection with the operation of ships;
(c) An accident in which a ship is lost, derelict or missing;
(d) An accident in which a ship collides with another ship, is stranded, capsizes or
sinks or it is impossible to steer a ship;
(e) An accident that causes marine pollution damage, in connection with the
operation of ships;” (MOAF, 2014).
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Compared to the definition of marine casualty used in IMO Resolution (IMO, ) it is
founded that the meaning of marine accident used in the Korean Act on the
Investigation of and Inquiry into Marine Accidents is reflected in the same with
internationally accepted meaning.

(2) Kind of Marine accident

Based on the annual accident report of KMST (2016), it is intended to analyse the
status of marine accidents and causes of marine accidents, specifically, passenger
ship accidents.

The kind of maritime accident that KMST has classified is as follow: collision, contact,
grounding, capsize, fire/explosion, sunk, machinery damage, fatalities, and hindrance
to safe navigation. Table 2-5 is shown the frequency of passenger ship accidents by
accident category during the period of 2012 - 2016. The most occupied type of
accident is machinery damage, accounting for 74 out of total 243 accidents, and the
following accidents are the hindrance to safe navigation (53), collision (32), contact
(19), grounding (9), fire/explosion (6), fatalities (6), capsized (2), and others are 42
cases.

Table 2-5. Frequency of passenger ship accidents by accident category (KMST, 2016)

Collision
Contact
Grounding
Capsized
Fire/Explosion
Sunk
Machinery
Damage

Fatalities
Hindrance to Safe
Navigation

Others
Total

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

8
5
1
7

5
1
1
2
5

5
3
5
1
1
16

5
5
3
1
1
25

9
5
1
21

32
19
9
2
6
74

6

8

2
11

2
12

2
16

6
53

5
32

7
29

7
51

12
66

11
65

42
243
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2.2.2. Statistics and causes of maritime accident

(1) Statistics of maritime accident

The maritime traffic safety environment in Korea coastal sea is so critical that there
are many risks of marine accidents. The coastal waters are complicated and narrow
in geographical form, and are often weathered by typhoons in summer, low pressure
in winter, and heavy fog. In addition, marine traffic volume is increasing continuously
in a limited space. While the number of high-speed crafts, very-large ships with substandard vessels is increasing, the qualities of the crew members operating on these
vessels and the motivation for boarding are also continuously deteriorating (Cho,
2002).

Due to these poor marine surroundings, recently the rate of marine casualties is
increasing each year compared to the number of vessels registered in Korea. As seen
in Figure 2-8, even though the registered vessels continue reduction trend from
84,466 in 2012 to 76,500 in 2015, the number of accidental vessels is raising up from
1,306 in 2013 to 2,549 in 2016, and the passenger ship also shows the same trend of
increasing from 29 to 65 in recent years. During the period of 2012 to 2016, there
have been 9,636 of accidental vessels, averaging 1,927 marine accidental vessels
annually, of which passenger ship accidents account for 2.52%, with 49 accidents
annually on average (KMST, 2016).

Remarkably, the number of marine accidental vessel in 2013 dropped significantly to
1,306, approximately 600 vessels fewer than the average annual maritime accidental
vessels, which had recorded over 1,800 vessels at the previous year. This can be
contributed to “The Project to Reduce Marine Accidents by 30%,” of the Ministry of
Oceans and Fisheries and the Korea Coast Guard (KCG). The Project has focused
on the prevention of marine accidents, of which fishing boats and small ships less
than 100 tons accounted for approximately 66% and 71.1% of maritime accidents,
respectively (Kim, 2015).
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Figure 2-8. Status of Marine Accident in Korea (KMST, 2016)
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4,000
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2,000

2,549

2,362
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75,000

65,000

1,854
1,565

1,306

1,500

70,000

60,000
55,000

1,000
500

50,000
2012

2013

2014

Number of accident vessels

2015

2016

Number of registered vessels

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

Registered Vessels(A)

84,466

80,647

77,730

76,500

-*

-

No. of Accident vessels(B)

1,854

1,306

1,565

2,362

2,549

9,636

Rate of Accident (B/A)

2.19%

1.62%

2.01%

3.09%

-

-

32

29

51

66

65

243

Passenger Ship Accident
Note: * Not recorded

In addition, Figure 2-9 describes the marine accidents rate by accident area over the
past five years. The accident area was divided as ports, channels, territorial Seas,
and open seas. Overall, the accident rate in the territorial waters is considerably
higher than that of open seas. The average of marine accidents occurred in the open
seas in the last five years is 15.5% whilst that within the ports and territorial waters is
84.5%. Therefore, it can be concluded that the geographical area should pay attention
to coastal waters (KMST, 2016).
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Figure 2-9 Status of maritime accidents by accident area (Source: KMST, 2016)
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2012

2013

Ports, Approaching Channels

2014

2015

Territorial Seas

2016
Open Seas

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Average

Ports,
Approaching
Channels

171
(10.9%)
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(2) Cause of Maritime Accident

According to KMST, the major causes of marine accident are following; operational
error such as violation of collision regulations, negligence of lookout, insufficient
courses checking, and poor fixing/keeping of courses, handling mistakes or
inappropriate maintenance of machinery, inappropriate performance for prevention of
accident, inappropriate working condition, defect of safety, inappropriate facilities,
defects of hull/engine room machinery, inappropriate management of ship operation,
force majeure of the sea, others, and unknown cause.

Table 2-6 describes the passenger ship accident frequency by the cause of accident
during the period of 2012 – 2016. The primary cause involved in the registered
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passenger ship accident is the operation error, with 44 cases. Of which, the violation
of general navigational laws occupied the highest frequency, accounting for 26 cases.
The next most frequent cause of accident was the inappropriate maintenance or
handling mistakes of machinery, with 40 cases during the past five years. Other
causes of violation of collision regulations, non-observance of order, inappropriate
takeover, inappropriate performance for prevention of accident, defects of hull/engine
room machinery, and force majeure of the sea were found one case, respectively,
including defect of safety with 2 cases.

Table 2-6 Frequency of passenger ship accidents per accident causes (KMST, 2016)
Accident Causes

Frequency

Violation of collision regulations

1

Violation of general regulations (lookout, fixing of ship’s position, and
fixing/keeping of courses, etc.)
Operational
Error

Poor preparation of departure (securing openings, checking of
loading condition, Furnishing of Chart & Publication, etc.)

26

12

Non-observance of order, inappropriate takeover

1

Others of operational error

4

Operation Error Sub-total

44

Inappropriate maintenance or handling mistakes of machinery
Inappropriate performance (Loading/unloading, working on board, etc.)

40
for

prevention of accident
Inappropriate working condition (Rest time, maintenance of facilities for prevention of
danger)

1

-

Defect of safety (Structure or quality of machinery)

2

Inappropriate facilities (Waterway, port, navigation aids)

-

Defects of hull/engine room machinery (Electronics, cargo handling, etc.)

1

Inappropriate management of ship operation

-

Force majeure of the sea

1

Others

-

Unknown cause

Total

89
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On the other hand, none of the cause of the Inappropriate working condition,
Inappropriate facilities, and Inappropriate management of ship operation was not
identified. Though these causes have not had an immediate impact on the accident,
it could be the underlying conditions which can lead to the active failure such as
operational errors or handling mistakes. Therefore, it is necessary to look deeply into
the investigation report, and if it reveals that these causes also affected to the accident
even indirectly, they should be considered to eliminate the potential risk factors.
2.3 Summary

This chapter provided the current status of passenger ships and related accidents in
Korea. In summary, most of the passenger ship operators are small scaled with a
small number of ships and capital amount, and the year of those ships are mostly over
than 15 years. Moreover, the average number of seafarers who are employed on the
passenger ships are much less than ships in the different type of domestic vessel or
international voyage passenger ship. Current identified issues of passenger ships
obviously show the correlation with the underperformance of Korean passenger ships.
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3. Theoretical frame of human error

3.1. Historical analysis of human error

As the complexities confronting the people in their work or social relations has begun
to emerge, behaviourism researchers of psychology have studied the realm of ‘human
factors’ that deal with the relationships of human and human, human and machine,
system, procedure, and human and environment to understand the complicated
situation. This study has gradually developed into the interdisciplinary research and
applied in different sphere including business administration, medicine, engineering
and so on. Human error is a phenomenon that results from inappropriate behaviour
in human interaction with these peripheral factors and has implication for the
degradation of performance, safety, and efficiency of the system.

Generally, the human error has been considered the cause of an accident and to be
in the inaccurate assessments, wrong decisions, and bad judgments. The classic
approach to the accident causation originated from Heinrich (1931), which is a
“Domino Theory,” emphasizing the chain of adverse event. This model has affected
to the change of focus on from the unsafe working condition to human error. The five
factors of Domino Theory are:


Social environment and Ancestry



Fault of Person



Unsafe acts and conditions (Mechanical and psychical error)



Accident



Injury
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Figure 3-1. Domino model of accident causation (modified from Heinrich (1931), Sabet, Aadal,
Jamshidi, and Rad, 2013)

Based on the domino model, “accident” is the one factor that leads to an injury, and
occurs only because of “Mechanical error”. For this reason, Heinrich proposed that
the accident can be prevented by removing the unsafe act/condition or
mechanical/physical hazard among the errors, and they should be received the most
attention. However, this theory has a weakness that only individuals are responsible
for the accident, not considering the problem of social environment or organisation
(Sabet, Aadal, Jamshidi, and Rad, 2013).
To supplement Heinrich’s theory, Bird and Loftus (1976) acknowledged that the
accident can be prevented by eliminating the basic cause rather than an immediate
cause, and represented the accident occurrence process by the following five steps:


Lack of control-management (inadequate program, inadequate program
standard, inadequate compliance to standard)



Basic cause-origins (personal and job factor)



Immediate causes-symptoms (sub-standard act and condition)



Incident (contact with energy and substance)



Injury-damage-loss

Bird recognized that since immediate causes are only a symptom of the basic causes,
eliminating the defects of control or management that suppress the occurrence of root
causes is a more fundamental prevention measure (WZS & ETC, n.d.a.).
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Figure 3-2. Updated Domino sequence of accident causation theory (Bird, 1976)

After that, as the point of view of human error changes, many researchers have
perceived that human error is a symptom of the system and its design, and tried to
find how people's assessments and actions made sense at the time, given the
circumstances that surrounded them (Dekker, 2001; Lee, 2002; Reason, 1990a;
Woods, Dekker & Cook, 1994). The typical model of human factor and elements
showing the concept of systems perspective is the SHELL model.
Hawkins's SHELL model (1983), modified SHEL model first developed by Elywyn
Edward (1972), constructed a human factor model, which polysynthetically and
systematically shows the interaction between humans and systems. The center of the
SHELL model, "L", is human (liveware), which is regarded as the subjects that perform
their duties. It is the most flexible and effective in the system, but it depends on the
individual’s ability to perform their work, which can cause many differences and
restrictions. “H” is hardware, which represents all devices operated by humans. "S" is
software, which is not an external element of the system, but rather laws, procedures
and computer programs. "E" is an environment that refers to all surrounding elements
of the system such as lighting, humidity, and temperature. Finally, "L" represents
another human who affects work (HP Repository, 2012).
Regarding human error, human factors related to center located L include personality,
attitude, and motivation. If there is a lack of understanding of relations between “L”
and each factor, errors may be caused. In L-H model, poor user experience occurs in
the man-machine system. Errors due to incorrect regulations and procedures can be
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explained in L-S model. The error in L-E model is due to work circumstance or weather
factors. In the L-L model, errors occur due to miscommunication among workers, lack
of cooperation, misunderstandings, emotions, and inadequate work loading.
However, this model is only constructed to understand human factors, so that it has
a limitation that it cannot cover the interface which is external human factors (H-H, HE, S-H) (HP Repository, 2012).
Figure 3-3. Hawkins's SHELL model (1983)

(Source: http://www. tgpilotrecruitment. Com /?page_id =78)

The analysis of human error is largely divided into quantitative analysis and qualitative
analysis. Quantitative analysis is a method to determine the occurrence probability of
human error in a specific work, but it is not suitable for the planning of the
countermeasure for prevention of recurrence of the accident because the description
of the cause of the accident is not presented. The qualitative analysis compensating
the defect of quantitative analysis is an in-depth analysis of the actual process of the
event, so it is possible to classify the human error, to identify the cause, and to
establish countermeasures (Park, 1993).
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In the qualitative analysis, the focus has been on the analysis method considering the
cognitive processes of workers. By replacing repetitive, time-intensive tasks with the
high-tech automation system, the role of workers has been changed from the actor to
the information processer that performs the task of resolving the problem through
decision-making. Accordingly, there is an increasing demand for the development of
error analysis method considering human decision-making process (Choi, Kim Y., &
Kim C., 2002).

Representative models that approach human errors from a cognitive perspective
include the model of human information processing by Wickens & Hollands (2000)
and the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) by Reason (1990b). The model of
Wickens & Hollands (2000) is classified the type of human error in terms of information
processing. Errors that arise in the planning phase occur in the perception and
cognitive processes, which can occur when the goal or situation is mistakenly
recognized. These errors are caused by exceeding the limits of memory or by bias
and may be due to the perceptual problems or cognitive vulnerabilities. Specifically,
mistakes are divided into knowledge-based mistakes and rule-based mistakes.

Knowledge-based mistakes occur in case of excess information or a lack of
knowledge to interpret the information. Rule-based mistakes are errors in rules,
procedures, etc., and can be divided into two cases: a misjudgment of rules,
procedures, etc., and a case where a wrong rule is applied to the current situation.
Errors in the memory phase happen in a form that is not followed the interactions that
occur in various processes due to the lost in memory. It is not a mistake in behavior,
but an unconscious mistake and the main cause is excessive work or interference.
Errors in the execution phase are cases where the situation recognition is correct but
the behavior is different from the intended behavior. The main cause is that to deviate
from the repetitive behavior or habituated behaviors are not carefully handled
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000).
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Figure 3-4

Model of Human Information Process (Modified from Wickens & Hollands, 2000)

The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) of Reason (1990b) divided human error
into four categories: slip by attention failure, lapse by memory failure, mistake and
violation of the failure of intended behavior. It is based heavily on Rasmussen’s
(1983) three major categories of errors: skill-based slips and lapses, rule-based
mistakes, and knowledge-based mistakes (SRK model). Slips are unintentional
behaviors that are caused by lack of attention or excessive attention in the cognitive
process or are caused by automated behavior in the process of execution. Lapses by
memory failure occur due to a mere memory failure by unintended behavior. It is more
difficult to identify than a mistake, more dangerous due to the internality, and can be
exacerbated when you think that further checking is unnecessary after completing a
task. The rule-based mistakes result from the selection of an inappropriate rule by the
distorted view of the state. The knowledge-based mistakes are due to the inaccurate
comprehension of the system, ascertainment bias, and overconfidence. A violation is
a case of intentionally deviating from the rules and procedures for safe and efficient
work.
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Figure 3-5. The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) of Reason (1990b)

(Source: https://www.maifa.org/resolution/resolutions/A.884(21)_APP_2_1.htm)

Reason (1990b) also systematically described the accident process with swiss
cheese with small holes in the middle of the accident. The hole means the deficiencies
of organizational levels. In this theory, Reason presented the theoretical basis that if
the accident occurred due to a series of human factors, the human error should be
extended to the overall problem including the organizational and regulatory factor.

Accordingly, there are four stages that happen adverse events: i) Unsafe Acts, ii)
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, iii) Supervisory Factors, and iv) Organizational
Influences. If at any time leading up to the adverse event, one of corrective action at
any stage is not prevented, the accident can occur. When analysing the cause of the
accident caused by human factors, although the active failure is directly attributable
to the front-line operator, specifically analysing the causes reveals that there are latent
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conditions that increase the likelihood of active failure. Such preconditions of
inappropriate behaviour, inadequate culture, and organizational influences can
aggravate the effects of the unsafe acts upon the system’s safety, restraints, and
barriers (Reason, 2016). Therefore, it can be said that accidents are caused by human
factors and system failures surrounding them, rather than technical defects.
Figure 3-6. Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990b)

However, this model was not sufficient to identify and classify the actual and latent
causes in a systematic method. In order to satisfy this need, the HFACS framework
was generated.
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3.2. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)

The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell and
Wiegmann, 2001) was originally developed and tested by the United States Navy to
identify and classify the human errors of aviation accidents. The HFACS framework
uses the same four levels of human failure presented by Reason’s model and
advanced the causal sub-categories to identify the actual and underlying factors that
occur accident. The HFACS framework assists accident investigators to
systematically identify the active and latent failures within the organization that lead
to an accident.

Figure 3-7. The HFACS framework (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2012)
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Currently, the HFACS framework is one of the most common frameworks which
adopted Reason’s theory on accident causation with active and latent failures.
Originally, since HFACS was designed to apply to the aviation accident, it could be
slightly revised to optimize for their industry field and utilised to analysis latent failures
or organisational defect in the existing accidents; air traffic control (HFACS-ATC:
Page, Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001; Scarborough, Bailey and Pounds, 2005),
aircraft maintenance extension (HFACS-ME: Krulak, 2004), offshore helicopter
transport industry (HFACS-HE: Omole and Walker, 2015), rail road (HFACS-RR:
Reinach and Viale, 2006; Baysari, McIntosh and Wilson, 2008; Madigan, Golightly
and Madders, 2016), health care (Diller, Dunning, Buchanan and Shappell, 2014;
Hoffman, Segal, Foster and Rhoads, 2013), mining industry (HFACS-MI: Patterson
and Shappell, 2010; Lenné, Salmon, Liu and Trotter, 2012).

The result of previous researches in the different industry fields appears that HFACS
is a reliable retrospective tool to analysis the extensive accident investigation reports,
identifying where and which errors and adverse events are underlying organizational
system.

In the maritime field, there have been a lot of studies using HFACS framework. Celik
and Cebi (2009) generated HFACS model, based on a Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy
Process (FAHP), to add the quantitative assessment of shipping accidents, and to
order of priority the contributing factors to the accidents. The results present the need
to recreate the safety guideline in the various industry field.

Furthermore, a dedicated Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) framework for
maritime accidents investigation and analysis was developed and named as HFACSMA framework (Chen and Chou, 2012; Chen, Wall, Davies, Yang, Wang and Chou,
2013). This framework includes structures which in conformity with the main concept
of HFACS, Reason 's Swiss Cheese Model, and Hawkins’ SHEL Model, combining
with Why-Because Graph (WBG). This integrated model not only demonstrates the
causation between factors but also presents the adverse affection between each level.
Overall, using the HFACS tool, an organization identifies the hidden failure
underneath the managerial control system that is likely to happen accident, and
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investigators could detect the reoccurring trend of human error and organizational
deficiencies through the existing accident.

The HFACS also can be utilised as the framework that reviews and analyses the
massive historical accidents and safety data. In addition, by breaking down the
contributing factors on investigation records, analysists could distinguish unsafe acts
and those related root causes so that the discovered factors could be helpful to
improve the safety quality of the organizational system.

3.3. Maritime HFACS Taxonomy

This study applied the newly developed Maritime HFACS framework by Kim, Na and
Ha (2011) for the purpose of analysing human factor related to the marine accident.
The Maritime HFACS framework is currently used by the investigators of Korea
Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST), the marine accident investigation institute, when
they identify human errors in categories of this framework on the phase of grasp and
analysis of human error in the investigation of marine accident.

As described earlier, HFACS model of the aviation industry is divided into four stages:
Unsafe Acts, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, Supervisory Factors, and Organizational
Influences. Combining the HFACS framework with six “Human elements” presented
on the IMO Casualty Investigation Code (Res.A.884(21)) and the “GEMS” framework,
the new model of Maritime HFACS was developed as Figure 3-8.
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Figure 3-8. Detail Components of Maritime HFACS

IMO Casualty
Investigation Code

GEMS Framework
(Reason, 1990)

IMO defined the latent factors affecting to human behaviour and working process as
six elements of People factors, Ship factors, Working and living conditions,
Organization on board, Shore-side management, and External influences and
environment. Conjoining these six factors with organisational influences, supervisory
factors, and precondition for unsafe acts of HFACS framework, the new category of
Organisational latent factor and Onboard latent factor was constructed.

In addition, Unsafe acts category was compounded of Unintentional action and
Intentional action of GEMS framework. In line with the result, a new Maritime HFACS
framework classified into three levels of Organisational influences, Precondition for
unsafe acts, and Unsafe acts was established as shown in Figure 3-9 (KMST, 2013).
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Figure 3-9. Maritime HFACS taxonomy

First Level: Organisational Influences

The first level of the Maritime HFACS framework is the phase of Organisational
influences by the shipowner/manager. Organisational failures are often hidden, so
they do not reveal easily during the accident investigation unless the organisational
scheme is understood clearly and the constant accident analysis framework is applied
to the organisation. Unfortunately, identification of the errors at this highest level could
be hindered because a company is reluctant to hold a liability for the failures with a
fear of blame. These organisational influences generally include Inappropriate
management/supervision, Inappropriate operation, and Violation.
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Inappropriate Management/supervision
Allocation and maintenance of organisational resources are the most obvious
decision-making of the shipowner/manager. Organisational resources encompass
human resources, technological resources, and equipment/facility resources.
Inadequate crew management/supervision, absence of training and mismanagement
of equipment could create an unsafe situation.

Inappropriate operation
This category refers to cooperate decision-making that governs formal process of the
organisation,

including

operations

and

procedures.

The

operation

tempo,

inappropriate operating system, improper operation plan, and absence of safety
culture belong to this category. In addition, the case of the poor working condition
such as improper punishment system, employment policy, etc. fall under the failure of
inappropriate operation.

Violations
The acts that shipowner/manager deliberately violates the regulation or rule, e.g. of
the unqualified crew onboard, violation of the safety manning, or acceptance of
violation of the crew.

Second Level: Preconditions for unsafe acts

The active failures of unsafe acts are so obvious that it is likely to conclude them as
the basic cause of the accident. However, accident investigators need to look deeper
into precondition of the unsafe act that caused the active failures to know why the
unsafe acts happened. The framework includes the second level of analysing the
preconditions for unsafe acts, which involves the Outside factors, Personnel factors,
and Onboard factors.

Outside factors
Outside factors consist of Environmental physical factors and Governance
rule/regulations. Physical phenomena refer operational environment such as weather,
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port facilities, current, pilot, etc. Governance rule/regulations are intended to
determine the compliance with safety regulation. This factor was added to the existing
HFACS framework, because one criticism of HFACS has been failed to consider the
external influences outside organizational level, such as government, regulators,
manufacturer, social, environmental, political, economic and customers influence, etc.
(Omole and Walker, 2015).

Accordingly, a lot of previous research applied the category of Rule/regulation to the
fifth level of HFACS framework; HFACS-HE (Omole and Walker, 2015), HFACS-MA
(Chen and Chou, 2012), HFACS-RR (Reinach and Viale, 2006), HFACS-MSS
(Schröder, Baldauf, and Ghirxi, 2011). This factor will ensure that the regulator’s
regime does not adversely affect a ship safety. The regulations should follow the
technical changes that contribute to the ship safety, and the process of establishing
safety standards should detect potential risk that leads to a loophole in the regulations.

Personnel factors
If the crew resource management or self-imposed stressors create the precondition
for unsafe behavior, these factors can be referred as Cognitive factors, Physical
factors and Personal readiness. Conditions of seafarers are closely related to their
behaviors.

Cognitive factors include the individual’s boredom,

inattention,

overconfidence, or a perceived absence of threat, and physiological state deals with
the normal functioning of body. It is important to determine their physical condition to
assure that not to increase the safety risk due to medical or physiological conditions.
Personal readiness refers to a state in which the crew has a sufficient knowledge
about navigation and machinery so that there are no obstacles or disabilities in the
operation of the ship, and that the crew is properly trained and educated.

Onboard factors
The factors related to the ship largely divided into Organisation onboard,
Technological factors, and Workplace factors. Organisational factors onboard cover
organisational climate and crew interaction. An organisational climate refers to the
variables working atmosphere within the organisation, including the structure, policies,
and culture affects individual behavior. Inadequate chain-of-command structure,
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adversarial policies and inappropriate rules, attitudes and customs of the ship could
contribute the manner in which the crew’s task is carried out negatively. Good crew
interaction can reduce the ineffective communication skill or a lack of teamwork. Poor
team coordination leads to confusion in individuals’ responsibilities, then results in the
organisational breakdown. Technological factors encompass the design of ship or
equipment, handling of cargoes, maintenance check-up status, ship’s draft, etc.
Workplace factors include the condition of work place such as lighting, noise, miasma,
working tool, etc.

Third Level: Unsafe Acts

Unsafe acts that directly lead to marine accidents are divided into Intentional and
Unintentional actions as follows; Slip, Lapse, Mistake, and Violation. Crew’s
behaviour is also divided into knowledge-based, rule-based and skill-based
behaviours through learning and experience.

Unintentional acts include a Slip and Lapse caused by a skill-based error. A Slip refers
to a situation where the understanding of the situation and the choice of behaviour
are correct, but the action itself is misplaced due to momentary attention failure. A
lapse refers to a behavioural failure due to a momentary memory problem. Intentional
acts contain a mistake and violation. A mistake includes knowledge-based errors that
indicate the uncomprehending acts or inaccurate behaviour by prejudice and rulebased errors due to excessive confidence. A violation represents a case of intentional
disregard of a regulation, rule or procedure.
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4. Methodology

4.1. Adoption of Maritime HFACS

The first step to analysis marine casualty investigation was to find a reasonable
analysis tool for distinguishing the active and latent factor of human error. Qualitative
methods can be more useful for identifying the human error and determining the
cause of the accident. One of the most well-known tools for assessing the human
causal factor is the HFACS framework. Many researchers have utilised the HFACS
tool to measure the actual and latent conditions involved in the accidents. Given the
previous success that HFACS, which developed in the aviation field, has been
modified and optimised in a variety of industries, it seems reasonable to apply the
HFACS framework to identify active and latent failures within the maritime accidents
in hopes that similar results could achieve. The amended HFACS framework for the
marine accident is called Marine HFACS.
As above mentioned, KMST adopted the Maritime HFACS framework as the analysis
method of human elements to the Guidelines for Maritime Accident Investigation
(2013) for their worksite operation of the marine accident investigation. According to
the guidelines, when it is unclear whether the identified potential factors are affected,
additional and repeated investigations are conducted to pinpoint potential factors that
cause the unsafe acts.
Consequently, this study, which re-analyses the accident investigation reports that
have identified human error in accordance with the Maritime HFACS framework, was
estimated as a meaningful research to show that whether the latent factors contained
in the accident report are sufficient to reveal the root cause of the accident, and the
identified human error represents the trends in overall passenger ship accident.
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For the demonstration of the application of the Marine HFACS category, the case of
“Precondition for unsafe acts” (1st tier), “Onboard factors” (2nd tier), and “Technological
factors” (3rd tier) can be given in terms of “Unsuitable equipment”. the “Technical
factors” is one of three resources of 3rd tier category included in “Onboard factors” of
the 2nd tier. The “Unsuitable equipment” such as spare parts not fitted to the specific
machinery on board can cause an equipment and machinery malfunction. From the
organisational point of view, it is required to look into how and why the unsuitable
component is allocated, and whether the seafarers already knew that and reported to
the upper level of organisation.

4.2. Database
Data was collected from marine accident reports released on the website of KMST.
Accident investigation reports for the aim of this study were selected based on the
following conditions; All cases of accidents are subjected to the completion of
judgment for cause investigation and responsibility for it. The accident period is
restricted to accidents that occurred from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015. The
ship type is limited to the passenger ship, including high-speed craft, super speed
craft, super high-speed craft, enclosed Ro-Pax, and opened Ro-Pax. A navigation
area is bound to Korean coastal sea. Passenger ships less than 100 gross tonnages
were removed from this object. The type of accident is selected by all kind of accident
causing death, injuries, damages on human and ship, and the accident which had a
potential to lead to these adverse events.

4.3. Data coding and analysis
Investigation reports were coded by the author with advice by two Human Factors
experts. Before beginning the HFACS coding, details about each accident were
extracted with ship name, ship age, ship type, gross tonnage, accident date, accident
type, accident location, and the result of accident.
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After that, the author looked through the investigation reports exhaustively, and the
contributory factors stated on the reports discern and distributed on the specific
category of Maritime HFACS framework. For this, the Maritime HFACS diagram
(Figure 3.9) and the classified code table for latent factors of Level 1 and 2 specified
in the Guideline for Maritime Accident Investigation (2013) (refer to Appendix B) were
used, with reference to the description and table of HFACS taxonomy provided in
Shappell and Wiegmann (2012). The total 96 human error causal factors were found
out in the 30 investigation reports. This paper allowed the repetition of code to find as
many human error causal factors as possible.
After all of the data was coded, the analysis stage commenced. First, the 96
contributing factors were classified under three levels of Maritime HFACS:
organisational influences, precondition for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. For the next
step, the factors in each category were subdivided into sub-categories depending on
their attribute. This stage allowed to confirm the contributory factors under each level
of Maritime HFACS framework by the different types of accidents: Machinery failure,
Grounding, Flooding, Contact, and Collision.
However, regarding the organisational influences of level 1, the author found that it is
not possible to assign the contributory factor related to the organisational procedure
such as procedural guidance or informational resources due to the lack of the code.
Although, the code of inappropriate procedure, regulations, instructions is included in
the organisation category of onboard factor, this is also considered to be a potential
safety issue for the organisation. In the present study, the factor of organisational
procedure was included in the category of operation at the level 1.
On completion of classification, the process of the relational analysis of contributing
factors between each level was carried out by accident type. Chased the deployment
process of each single accident, related causal factors between the level were linked
to each other. This final step explored the specific pattern of the accidents and the
contributing factors that need further inquest.
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5. Results and discussion

5.1. Accident database

A total of 30 accident cases that occurred in the two years span between 2014 and
2015 were used in the analysis, involving five main types of accidents as follows
(KMST, 2016).


Machinery damage/failure (N= 16)



Collision (with other vessels) (N= 5)



Grounding (N= 4)



Contact (to bridge or pier) (N= 3)



Flooding (N= 2)

The highest frequency of machinery damage/failure shows the similarity with the
passenger ship accident statistics over the past five years (Table 2-5), which recorded
the largest portion of 30.4% concerning machinery damage/failure.
The average year of 30 accident vessels was 15.3 by the time of the accident,
occurring mostly in 16 years and more, with 66.7%. The frequency of vessels by ship
year as follows.


01 – 05year (N= 5)



16 - 10year (N= 3)



11 – 15year (N= 2)



16 – 20year (N= 13)



Over 20year (N= 7)
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With respect to the accident location, the 11 cases of accidents in ports or
approaching channels occurred, accounting for 36.7%. This ratio is much higher than
the result of statistics in the past five years, which accounted for 12.9% (Figure 2-9).
Of the 11 accidents, six were accidents caused by machinery damage. This fact
suggests that passenger ship with frequent inbound and outbound ports should pay
particular attention to the use of the machinery.

Regarding the effect of the accidents, most accidents only suffered minor damage to
the hull and equipment, except one person of drowning in a collision accident. In
addition, the total 19 injuries occurred in contact and collision accidents. In the one
case of the flooding accident, the discharge valve of the lubricating oil tank was
opened due to flooded engine room, and 195 litres of lubricating oil and 5 litres of
bilge water were discharged into the sea, resulting in marine pollution. The details
about accident vessel list can be shown in Appendix A.

As mentioned earlier, Maritime HFACS is a contributory factor analysis framework
that investigators of KMST use to refer to investigation reports presently, so there was
no major difficulty in dividing the factors presented in the report back into the
framework. The investigators examined contributing factors, focusing on unsafe
actions and thoughts of the crew that had an impact on the immediate cause of the
accident, and potential condition that affects to the active failures.

Accordingly, this coding work carried out only with the contents described in the
accident investigation reports. As a result of the examination, the distribution of
HFACS category in the 30 investigation reports is described in Table 5-1. A total of
96 contributing factors were identified, averaging 3.2 factors per investigation report.
Grounding and flooding accident report were the highest, with an average of 4.5
factors, and machinery failure accident report were the lowest, with an average 2.4
factors.
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Table 5-1. Distribution of number of causal factors by accident type
Frequency
of Accident

Number of
Causal
Factors

Machinery failure

16

Grounding

Type of Accident

Number of causal factors per
accident cases
Min

Max

Mean

39

1

4

2.4

4

18

4

5

4.5

Flooding

2

9

4

5

4.5

Contact

3

12

2

6

4.0

Collision

5

18

2

6

3.6

Total

30

96

5.2. Causal factor coding

After all the contributory factors have been identified, the first step for coding was
executed. These factors were classified by three levels of Maritime HFACS:
organisational Influences, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts.

Table 5-2 shows that the frequency of causal factors of 30 accident investigation
reports and the percentage, which is the ratio frequency occurrence to the total 96
contributory factors. The category of the highest proportion of HFACS category is the
unsafe acts (42.7%), followed by preconditions for unsafe acts (39.6%) and
organisational influences (17.7%). Then, the contributory factors allocated in each
HFACS category further classified into 15 subcategories.

At the level 1 of organisational influences category, the factors related to the
company’s management/supervision were higher than operation, with 12.5% and
5.2%, respectively. However, violation of the organisation was not mentioned in the
accident report. Among the level 2 of pre-conditions for unsafe acts, onboard
organisation factors show a highest ratio in the accident reports, accounting for 9.6%.
personnel readiness in personnel factors and physical environment in outside factors
were the highest as 8.3% and 7.3%, respectively. However, none of the reports
referred to the causal factors involved in physiological state of seafarers. In the level

４６

3 of unsafe acts category, the proportion of violations was the most frequent category,
accounting for 25%, followed by mistakes as 15.6%.

Table 5-2. Distribution of casual factors of HFACS category
Category
Level
1

Sub-category

Percentage

12
5
-

12.5%
5.2%
-

Physical Environment
Rule/ Regulations
Cognitive factors
Physiological factors
Personnel readiness
Organisation
Technological factors
Workplace factors

7
1
5
8
10
6
1

7.3%
1.0%
5.2%
8.3%
9.6%
6.3%
1.0%

Slip
Lapse
Mistake
Violation

1
1
15
24

1.0%
1.0%
15.6%
25.0%

96

100.0%

Organisational Influences (17.7%)
Management/Supervision
Operation
Violations
Pre-conditions for unsafe acts (39.6%)
Outside factors

Level
2

Frequency

Personnel factors

Onboard factors

Unsafe acts (42.7%)
Level
3

Unintentional
Intentional
Total

5.3. HFACS category analysis

Figure 5-1 describes the percentage of casual factors by accident type. In all types of
accident reports, it can be seen that each level’s contributing factors have been found.
The machinery failure accident as unsafe act of HFACS category was classified more
often than other categories, accounting for 16.7%, whilst the organisation Influences
factors of collision and grounding accident were the lowest proportion with 1.0%. In
the grounding accident report, the proportion of precondition for unsafe acts factors
was significantly higher than level 1 and level 3, accounting for 11.5%. As for the
collision accident, the frequency of unsafe acts was significantly higher than other
levels, with 12.5%.
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Figure 5-1. Percentage of casual factors by accident type

Collision
Contact
Flooding
Grounding
Machinery
0.0%

10.0%

Lv.1 Organisation

20.0%

30.0%

Lv. 2 Precondition

40.0%

50.0%

Lv. 3 Unsafe acts

Further analysis to examine the interrelation between the HFACS subcategory and
accident types were conducted. The frequency and proportion of causal factors by
accident type is demonstrated on Table 5-3 below.

In case of the machinery failure, the violation in the level 3 of unsafe acts was the
highest (35.9%), followed by the organisational management/supervision (20.5%).
Among the preconditions for unsafe acts, 12.8% were the onboard organisational
factors.

In the grounding accident, mistakes of seafarers were the largest portion with 33.3%
and personnel readiness with 22.2% and physical environment with 16.7% appeared
at a high frequency.

In two cases of the flooding, one lapse and one mistake for the unsafe acts were
identified. And, as the precondition for unsafe acts, onboard factors were most
frequently founded, accounting for 44.4%. At the Level 1 of organisational influences,
two factors of management/supervision and one factor of operation were discovered.
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Table 5-3. Distribution of causal factors of HFACS subcategory by accident type
Category

Subcategory

Flood#(%)

Contact
#(%)

Collision
#(%)

Total
#(%)

8
(20.5)

-

2
(22.2)

1
(8.3)

1
(5.6)

12
(12.5)

Operation

2
(5.1)

1
(5.6)

1
(11.1)

1
(8.3)

-

5
(5.2)

Violations

-

-

-

-

-

-

Physical
Environment

-

3
(16.7)

-

1
(8.3)

3
(16.7)

7
(7.3)

Rule/ Regulations

-

1
(5.6)

-

-

-

1
(1.0)

2
(5.1)

1
(5.6)

-

1
(8.3)

1
(5.6)

5
(5.2)

-

-

-

-

-

-

2
(5.1)

4
(22.2)

-

1
(8.3)

1
(5.6)

8
(8.3)

5
(12.8)

2
(11.1)

2
(22.2)

1
(8.3)

-

10
(9.6)

4
(10.2)

-

1
(11.1)

1
(8.3)

-

6
(6.3)

-

-

1
(11.1)

-

-

1
(1.0)

1
(2.6)

-

-

-

-

1
(1.0)

-

-

1
(11.1)

-

-

1
(1.0)

Mistake

1
(2.6)

6
(33.3)

1
(11.1)

3
(25.0)

4
(22.2)

15
(15.6)

Violation

14
(35.9)

-

-

2
(16.7)

8
(44.4)

24
(25.0)

39
(100)

18
(100)

9
(100)

12
(100)

18
(100)

96
(100)

Outside
factors

Cognitive factors
Personnel
factors

Onboard
factors

Physiological
factors
Personnel
readiness
Onboard
organisation
Technological
factors
Workplace factors

Lv
3

Ground#(%)

Management/ Supervision
Lv
1

Lv
2

Mach#(%)

Unintentional
acts
Intentional

acts

Slip
Lapse

Total

The contact accident report reveals three factors of mistakes and two factors of
violation of seafarers, which are most occupied with 41.7%. The elements related to
Level 1 and Level 2 were found to be very diverse; manage/supervision, operation of
organisational influences and physical environment, cognitive factor, personnel
readiness, onboard organisation and technological factor of precondition.

With regard to the collision accident, the most common violation of unsafe acts was
found (44.4%), and the next high frequency was the mistakes with 22.2%. The
precondition that most affected the accident revealed the physical environment,
accounting for 16.7%.
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5.4. Factor relationship analysis by accident type

Based on the contributing factors identified in the subcategory by level, the author
probed into the detailed conditions of single accident case and integrated into each
level by accident type. In addition, the author inspected the relationship of contributing
factors at each level to those at different levels to determine whether the latent failures
of level 1 and 2 have been sufficiently discovered by investigators. For this purpose,
the author found correlations by finding level 2 factors that could originate from level
1 or that level 1 affected, and then, determined the factors of unsafe acts that could
be caused by the factor of level 2 and connected them to each other. For example,
the absence of educational-training by the shipowner/manager triggered the lack of
knowledge of seafarers as a latent error and unsafe acts that may occur due to lack
of knowledge of level 2 is the operational inability of equipment.

Machinery Failure

16 accident reports of machinery failure have found out 39 contributory factors. Figure
5-2 exhibits a diagram of the relationships in which the contributing factors identified
at each level are affecting contributing factors at different levels, in terms of machinery
failure accident. In 14 of the 16 accident cases, the accident reports indicated that the
active failure of the machinery defect was due to maintenance negligence of
machinery by Chief Engineer (C/E) or Captain. In order to provide a more specific
overview about the machinery failure resulted from improper maintenance, some
technical casual factors involved in malfunctioning of a machinery are shown in Table
5-4.
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▌ Figure 5-2. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Machinery Failure)

*Note: 1. The number means the frequency of contributory factors.
2. Dotted line describes the relationships that did not directly affect the lower-level factors, but
which, in combination with those factors, had an impact on the accident.
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Table 5-4. Reported technical causes of machinery failure






Main Engine
- Piston Pin Bush to break loose
- Breather valve breakdown caused Fresh water tank exploded
- Turbo charger inhalation fixing spring to break loose
- Stud fatigue scission
- Impurities in cooling water system
- Cylinder Fuel injection nozzle cap overtightening cause sealing damaged
- Cylinder inhalation valve sheet faulty
- Cylinder inhalation valve collet fatigue scission
Steering Gear
- Relay Switch breakdown
- Steering Shaft to break loose
Rudder
- Leakage of Gland packing
- Piston Pin Bush to break loose
Miscellaneous
- Impurities in Fuel oil filter cause Relief valve damaged
- Spare Seawater pump fatigue scission

As illustrated in Figure 5-2, a variety of factors on the level 2 contributed to the latent
cause of the maintenance negligence. Regarding the personnel factors, the different
two cases showing the inability to judge the situation despite the perception of risk
indicator and the failure to prepare a maintenance record imply that the C/E has an
undesirable attitude to their duty. In the first event, however, the onshore supervisor
also did not take any action against the identified risk on the main engine despite
every week inspection, and in the second event, the shipowner operated the vessel
without confirming the specific maintenance details since the purchase of the vessel.
These inadequate systematic supervision and inspection were found to affect the
unfavourable attitude of the seafarers.

The time constraints indicated as the other cause of the maintenance negligence are
the potential factors that threaten the safety of passenger ship with frequent inbound
and outbound port. Although, the investigation report no longer discussed this issue
in detail, this problem should inquire the reason through multifarious approaches and
eliminate the latent conditions by managerial control such as the redistribution of
workload, new recruits, or a support from onshore.
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The preterition of the takeover procedure and unavailable informational resources
suggest that there is a problem within the operational system of the company as well
as the direct responsibility of seafarers. These inappropriate management of
company has a negative impact on the safety working onboard.
In addition, the inattentive maintenance of crew members can be eliminated in
advance by thorough supervision of the company. Five investigation reports out of 16
referred the inadequate supervision of manager as the latent failure of Level 1. The
role of the manager as a supervisor is to periodically check the company's overall
operations, decisions, policies, and safety status of the ship to remove the hazards
onboard previously.
The insufficient information of equipment also brought about the machinery defect.
The lack of safety education onboard made seafarers’ careless action and the
absence of technical knowledge caused the unskilled handling by seafarer. It is
important to note that thorough training and skilful handling of equipment are essential
for the seafarer onboard ship.
The responsibility for the actual management of the hull, machinery and equipment is
on the captain and the C/E, but the ship owner is also obliged to maintain good
condition of the ship so that the hull, machinery and equipment operate normally. To
provide suitable human and equipment resources onboard, to establish appropriate
performance standards, and to dispatch the qualified supervisors could be the barriers
to avoid the machinery failure.

Grounding

Four investigation reports of the grounding identified 18 causal factors. Figure 5-3
demonstrates the casual factors of each level and those relationships with regard to
grounding accident. In which, most of the factors related to the unsafe acts of the
seafarers and latent factors related to the ship were identified.
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▌ Figure 5-3. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Grounding)

Active failure of grounding accident significantly revealed the failure of fixing on ship’s
position and improper manoeuvre. As the latent cause for the unknown ship’s position,
the improper use of navigational aids (e.g. GPS plotter, radar, etc.) and the
discomposure of seafarers with heavy rain contributed to the unsafe acts. Regarding
the latent factors that caused inappropriate manoeuvre, the combination of
environmental factor (current) and operational factors (lack of watchkeeping) on board
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led the ship to the shallow water area. The lack of navigational information affects to
the selection of safe course, resulting in the wrong decision. However, as the causal
factors of inappropriate use of navigational aids and the lack of watchkeeper is
insufficient on the investigation reports, it is needed to provide further investigation of
organisational management or supervision.
Furthermore, the compelling ship manager to operate vessels without adequate port
information was a threat to the preparation of seafarers for safe navigation, which in
turn affects the unsafe acts of seafarers. In this case, the fact that the port authority,
who had a dredging construction in the port, has not properly reviewed the dredging
work in the process of approval of ship’s course and trial running was the one of the
contributory factors.
A possible explanation for the main contributory factors to the grounding accident may
be the lack of adequate navigation skill, planning, and heavy weather. For the
organisational approach, it is required further investigation for use of the navigation
equipment, the placement of watchkeeper, and operational procedure for the irregular
circumstance.

Flooding

Two flooding accident reports revealed nine contributory factors. The results of the
interrelation analysis of contributory factors involved in Flooding accident are shown
in Figure 5-4. These flooding accidents were caused by seawater inflow through hole
on the hull. The first accident was resulted from the stagnant bilge and painting
missing on the engine room bottom. This could be caused by the negligence of the
management of the C/E, but it was also discovered as a potential cause of the
insufficient maintenance and inappropriate supervision of manager.

The second accident caused by the fact that the C/E did not close the inspection hole
while simultaneously handling the important work. However, the factor that the
shipowner did not set up a procedure for major work was a latent failure, which the
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C/E handled the two tasks alone at the same time. Hence, in order to assure the ship’s
safety, proper management and supervision of the ship is required.
▌ Figure 5-4. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Flooding)

Contact

Contact with pier or bridge accident occurred three events and 12 contributing factors
were identified. Figure 5-5 below illustrates the relations of casual factors between
levels of Contact accident. The active failure of contact is divided into the out of control
due to mechanical failure (two cases) and improper manoeuvre due to contrary
weather (one case). The defects that caused the engine failure were already
recognized by the crew and the manager. To ignore the warning alarm with a
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complacency, or not to set an emergency plan in spite of recognizing the state of an
unstable machine, was enough to bring about an accident.
Figure 5-5. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels (Contact)

At the organisational level, continuing to operate without sufficient action on the flaw
is a potential cause of the accident. The insufficient safety standards of the
shipowners make it difficult for the crew to judge the situation properly, which leads
directly to improper operation. As for the overspeed of unsafe acts, it is needed to
identify whether this problem is involved in the individual habit or is influenced by the
operational tempo.
Looking at the pathway of contact accident, unsolved machinery damage, which
combined with overspeed of engine or complacency resulted in the machinery failure,
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and insufficient safety standards for the heavy weather affected to decision error of
inappropriate manoeuvre.

Collision

Five collision accident reports described 18 causal factors. Figure 5-6 provides the
intercorrelations of casual factors between levels of Collision accident. All five
Collisions were caused by violations of navigational laws. The violation of Fog
navigational regulations (fog signal, look-out, etc.), overspeed, and the non-fulfilment
of collision-avoidance action were the active failure of the collision accident.
These violations of regulation determined a latent failure of the lack of navigation
knowledge of seafarers, which results from the insufficient education-training by
shipowner/manager. In the non-fulfilment of collision-avoidance action, the
complacency of seafarers affected to the unsafe acts.
Although collision accidents are highly influenced by the limited visibility, the
navigational law observance and safety awareness development through education
and training can reduce the risk of accident.
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▌ Figure 5-6. Relations of Casual Factors between Levels ( Collision)

5.5. Discussion

An initial objective of this dissertation was to identify the active and latent failures of
the existing investigation reports, the accident mechanism by accident type, and the
quality of investigation reports.
The analysis of 30 investigation reports using HFACS tool has enabled to discovery
of 96 human error causal factors involved in passenger ship accident. The relational
analysis between active and latent failures has facilitated to understand of accident
pattern from the latent factors of the organisational system through the latent factors
of onboard to the unsafe acts of seafarers. Additionally, the relational analysis has
suggested the causal factors that need further development.
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5.5.1. HFACS Utility

The HFACS framework helps to distinguish active failures and latent failures involving
in the existing accident reports. In this study, the category with the most common
contributory factor in the level of unsafe acts is the violations by seafarers. Compared
with an another HFACS analysis of tugboat collision accident in Korea (Kim et al.,
2011), unsafe acts mainly related to mistake (48.4%) and violation (42.4%), which
also are the highest portion among all categories. However, in the previous research
in both maritime (Chauvin, Lardjane, Morel, Clostermann, and Langard, 2013;
Schröder et al., 2011) and other industries (Griggs, 2012; Madigan, Golightly and
Madders, 2016; Patterson et al., 2010), violation rarely accounts for the highest
percentage of all categories, as well as at the level of unsafe acts.
At the precondition for unsafe acts, the condition of onboard organisation occupied
the largest portion, followed by personnel readiness, physical environment, and
technological factor. Li, Harris and Yu (2008) also identified crew resources
management as the most common factor of precondition. However, the prevailing
factor of precondition has been variously identified in the different research; selfimposed stress (Griggs, 2012), adverse mental state (Madigan et al., 2016),
technological environment (Reinach and Viale, 2006; Schröder et al., 2011), and
physical conditions (Patterson et al., 2010).
At the level of organisational influences, like the earlier studies, the analysis reveals
a relatively less frequency of factors compared to other levels. However, the
percentage of organisational influences found in the reports was 17.7%, which was
relatively low compared to other research: Griggs (2012): 37%; Madigan et al. (2016):
21.6%; Schröder et al. (2011): 23.1%.
As mentioned earlier, one of key findings from the causal factor analysis was the lack
of code for organisational procedure. Issues related to the inappropriate
organisational procedure identified in the investigation reports are; the lack of duty
transfer procedure, the machinery instructions written in foreign language, insufficient
safety standards for heavy weather, and the lack of critical operation procedure (e.g.,
bunkering). Patterson et al., (2010) showed that procedures were most common
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(77.2%) within organisational process category, and argued that the lack of standard
procedures makes the crew select the accomplishing method, which is not always the
safest way to complete. This study also described that the procedural errors of
organisation affected a variety of factors of precondition e.g., improper duty handover,
inappropriate procedure on board, and estimate of the situation inability. Moreover,
the code of inappropriate procedure of onboard factor category can be considered to
be the responsibility of Captain or C/E, not the safety manager or shipowner.
Therefore, the addition of organisational procedure category to the Maritime HFACS
framework would provide an additional opportunity to understand the impact of
improper procedure at the organisational level on the ship safety.
Overall, these analyses demonstrate that the types and frequency of contributory
factors may vary by the research field, but the most obvious finding to emerge from
the HFACS analysis is that there are latent failures in all actual failures. This focus
attention to the importance of violations of seafarers and onboard organisational
factors to the passenger ship safety and demonstrate where supplement
(organisational procedure) is required.

5.5.2. Pattern of accident cause

The analysis of investigation reports facilitates to establish the typical pattern of
accident cause, although the case by accident type is small and the contributory
factors at upper levels are not sufficient to know their influences the lower levels.
Based on the relationships of contributory factors at each level by accident type, in
total nine patterns are identified with active failure and latent failure. With regard to
the presence of pattern, the relative risk associated with these failures are accessed,
and the countermeasures to mitigate the failure are given to the Table 5-5.
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Table 5-5.
Accident
Type

Pattern of passenger ship accident cause
Pattern
#

Latent
Failure

Implications
Lack of
procedure/
guideline
caused the
unawareness
of machinery
condition

Reassess
present
procedure/
checklist, and
Provide
training

Operating
procedure

#2

Unskilled
handling

Resource
Management
(Human)

Unqualified
seafarers

#3

Maintenance
Negligence

Unsafe
supervision

Failure of risk
assessment

#4

Inappropriate
manoeuvre

Operational
tempo

Lack of
navigational
information

Provide
educationtraining

#5

Maintenance
negligence

Unsafe
supervision

Failure of risk
assessment

Assign
qualified
supervisor

#6

Lapse

Operating
procedure

Imperfection of
duty

Develop
working
procedure

#7

Maintenance
Negligence

Resource
Management
(Equipment)

Machinery
deficiency

Revaluate the
present
procedure
Establishment
of operational
procedure
Provide
educationtraining

Machinery
Failure

Flooding

#8

Inappropriate
manoeuvre

Operating
procedure

Lack of
procedure/
guideline
caused
decision error

#9

Violation of
navigation rule

Resource
Management
(Human)

Unqualified
seafarers

Contact

Collision

Countermeasures

Maintenance
Negligence

#1

Grounding

Active
Failure

Provide
instructions for
mechanical
operation and
training
Assign
qualified
supervisor

What stands out in the accident pattern is that there are various latent factors that
affect the maintenance negligence, which is the most common active cause, and the
implications and countermeasures against them are also different. This result argues
that the high maintenance should be supported by the appropriate operating
procedure,

safety

supervision,

education-training

management for equipment at the organisational level.
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and

sufficient

resource

5.5.3. Quality of investigation reports

One of the objective of this study is to examine whether the investigation reports
reflect enough detail organisational causal factors underlying within the managerial
control system. As expected, however, like in previous studies, the data contained in
the investigation reports was a few in quantity to discover the root cause of the
accident. The major shortcomings of HFACS framework for identifying the
contributory factors are the need of the massive database of factors, since lots of
previous studies demonstrate that systematic approaches depend on the quality of
the data provided (Madigan et al., 2016).
Marine accident has a difficulty to investigate causal factors unlike the accident within
land, as it is difficult to gather and secure evidence, such as preserving the accident
site, recreating the accident and securing witnesses. In addition, the cause of the
accident is fundamentally complex and diverse. Thus, it is not a simple task to
discover the latent cause of the accident, unless the investigator conducts an in-depth
investigation of the organisation.
However, according to the other research, since the KCG and KMST, who are
responsible for the investigation and judgment of marine accidents in Korea, identify
causes of accidents mainly for the purpose of identifying violation of the law and
estimating the ratio of responsibility, it is considered that the accident investigators do
not pay careful attention to establish the root cause of an accident to prevent further
accident (SNAK, 2015).
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the potential of the organisation could
be a fatal cause of accidents. As KMST already uses HFACS framework as an
accident investigation tool, it is estimated that it is fully aware of the importance of
human factors and latent conditions underlying organisational system. The fact that
there is the contributory factor which is not included under the Maritime HFACS
category (organisational procedure) suggests the possibility that more latent factors
may be found. It is necessary to clarify what is the root cause of the accident through
the multiple investigations including the education-training of the seafarers, the

６３

working process, the organisational culture, and not only the fragmentary cause of
the accident.
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6. Conclusions

6.1. Conclusions

Although the internal and external research that human error as a cause of accident
occupies over 80% of marine accident, the object or application of human error in
Korea maritime field is not sufficient. While the maritime technology has progressed
evidently in material aspects of navigational hardware equipment such as Automatic
Identification System (AIS), Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA), Electronic Chart
Display and Information System (ECDIS), and E-navigation system, a study for
advancements of the seafarers’ software aspect is the slow lane, comparing with the
technological development. Although the sinking accident of Sewol ferry on the
Korean coast gave a tremendous shock to our society and made the necessity of
studying human elements more urgently, much research is still needed in the field of
human error causal factor on the safety of the passenger ship in Korea.
Accordingly, the aim of the current study was to determine the contributory factors to
the passenger ship accident, and discussed the safety issue related to the passenger
ship and the depth of information in the investigation reports. For the purpose, this
paper presented the review of 30 accident investigation reports in order to examine
the human error causal factors contributing to the passenger ship accident in Korean
domestic water. The customized HFACS framework to the maritime accident was
adopted and used to analyse the causal factors described in the accident reports.
As a result, this study successfully demonstrates the validity of HFACS, that is, the
analysis of human factors for the cause of marine accidents and the retrospective
analysis of existing accidents. The adopted Maritime HFACS framework used in this
study was able to identify 96 human error causal factors on three different level:
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organisational influences, precondition of unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. The relational
analysis of distributed factors between levels facilitated to understand the pattern of
accident type.
As a predominant result, the violation of crew, specifically those related to the
maintenance negligence and violation of navigation law, was found that it had the
greatest impact on the passenger ship accidents. As for the onboard latent failures,
onboard organisation, personnel readiness, physical environment, technological
factors, and cognitive factors affected the unsafe acts. At the organisational level, the
factor of resource management and unsafe supervision exercised an influence on the
lower level.
The key findings in this study make available a new understanding of organisational
procedure. The addition of the category of organisational procedure may provide
further various aspect to the organisational influences. Also, this study confirmed that
even though different accidents were caused by the same active failure, the latent
condition affecting the active cause identified differently. Linked to this, the prevention
plan against all potential failures should be prepared in advance to hinder even a
single accident rather than a reduction in accident.
Including this research, many of the existing studies discussed in this paper presents
the lowest frequent findings of organisational failures, comparing with the level of
active failures. This study did not reveal the specific reason for the lack of
organisational factors, but it is considered that the acquisition of data is difficult due
to the special environment of the ocean or the accident investigation focuses more on
the estimation of liability for violation of laws than on the identification of causes of
accidents.
The contemporary marine safety issue requires discovering the latent failure to
approach into the unobserved but fatal cause. Although identifying potential factors is
necessary for the investigators to make tremendous efforts and sincerity, it is an
essential process to eliminate the repetition of another accident risk. In order to ensure
the marine safety, it is necessary to thoroughly and systematically carry out the
investigation of all details of human factors from seafarers' navigation skill at every
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accident. By using the data analysis from the higher quality of investigation reports,
we are able to establish the effective strategy for the marine safety and reduce the
repetitive mistakes.

6.2 Limitations and future research

This study has limitations and pragmatic performance as well. This paper shows the
way to advanced study for the safety issues of marine accident, particularly to the
passenger ship.
This dissertation has the objective of factor analysis for the identification of active and
latent cause of passenger ship accidents, but the study is limited by the lack of
information on the organisational latent conditions in the investigation reports. The
development of organisational elements, along with the addition of organisational
procedure code, is a more challenging task for investigators.
Secondly, this study is limited to passenger ship only, but by expanding the research
area with various types of vessels, it would be possible to improve the overall quality
of ship’s safety by finding measures to prevent human error that may be present in
the entire domestic ship.
A third limitation is the bias of the author. Even if the contribution factors are
objectively analysed based on the contents of the report only and classified according
to the category of HFACS, the results cannot help but reflect the opinions expressed
by the author.
Finally, only HFACS tool was used in this study to identify the predominant causal
factors. Further analysis through comparison with other systemic analytical tools, e.g.
Accimap (Rasmussen, 1997), FRAM (Hollnagel, 2012), is required for the practical
objective.
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Appendix A
List of selected investigation reports into passenger ship accident
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Date
Ship Name
18-2-14 SHINANFERRY NO.2
21-5-14 DAEHUNG
16-11-15 JOYANGFERRY NO.2
24-3-15 GUMOHGOSOKFERRY
23-5-14 PARADAIS
11-8-15 PANSTARDREAM
03-9-15 CSTAR 3
20-5-15 CSTAR 1
26-2-15 SAMBO NO.12
05-5-15 SUNFLOWER
11-12-14 SEODONGGOSOKFERRY NO.1
01-3-15 JULIAAQUA
15-6-14 SINHAE NO.9
10-5-14 KOREANA
04-5-14 SEAHOPE
02-5-14 DOLPHIN
15-12-15 SHINANFERRY NO.5
23-9-15 GUMOHFERRY NO.3
17-8-14 CHEONSA CARFERRY
23-6-15 HANILREDPEARL
30-5-15 NEW NAMHAEQUEEN
21-3-14 DDANGKKUT
20-10-15 MOSULPO NO.2
25-10-15 QUEENSTAR NO.2
10-12-14 NAMHAEGOSOKCARFERRY NO.7
26-10-14 NAMHAEGOSOKCARFERRY NO.7
19-8-14 HANRYUFERRY
17-1-15 SEOKYUNG ISLAND
19-7-14 RAINBOW
28-3-14 DEMOCRACY NO.5

Age
4
3
20
12
20
18
17
6
7
20
17
20
17
17
23
18
2
22
10
20
21
14
1
2
23
23
21
22
18
20

GT
400
424
196
255
309
9,759
550
388
393
2,394
333
228
154
226
299
310
353
137
279
2,862
477
225
156
364
3,780
3,780
178
5,223
228
396

Category of Accident
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Machinery damage/failure
Grounding
Grounding
Grounding
Grounding
Flooding
Flooding
Contact(eg. bridge, pier)
Contact(eg. bridge, pier)
Contact(eg. bridge, pier)
Collision(F/V SINGSING)
Collision(F/V NO.808 TAEYANG)
Collision(O/T MANSUNG)
Collision(F/V GUKILHO)
Collision(F/V ENSUK NO.5)
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Accident location
Haenam-gun, Hwawon-myeon
Sinangun, Palgeummyeon
Mokpo port
Yeosu, Nammyeon
Sinangun, Anjwamyeon
Busan port
Gangleung port
Sadong port
Eolyujeong port
Ulleungdo
Tongyeong, Yeonghwado
Yeosu
Yeonggwanggun, Gyema port
Incheon, Palmido
Ongjingun, Daechungmyeon
Ulleunggun, Dokdo
Shinangun, Jangsanmyeon
Goheunggun, Jijukdo
Shinangun, Hyojido
Jeju, Shinyang port
Mokpo port
Wando, Sanyangjin Pier
Seogwipo, Mosul port
Jeju Sangchujado
Gohunggun, Nokdong New port
Gohunggun, Sologhwado
Yeosu, Dolsan 1st Bridge
Busan port
Incheon, Ongjingun
Incheon, Ongjingun

Damage for Ship
Steering gear damage
Steering gear damage
Steering gear damage
No damage
Main Engine damage
Main Engine damage
Main Engine damage
Seawater Pump damage
Water Tank Explosion
Main Engine damage
Steering gear damage
Fuel Oil Filter damage
Main Engine damage
Main Engine damage
Main Engine damage
Main Engine damage
Rudder/Propeller damage
Bottom scratches
Propeller damage
Bottom dent
Lubricant, Bilge leakage
Engine room Flooding
Handrail damage
Hull warp
Bow Ramp damage
No damage
Hull dent
Hull scratches
Bow dent
Pitting

Casualty

11p injury
6p injury
1p drowning, 1p injury
8p wounds

Appendix B
Latent causal factor code of Maritime HFACS
(Translated)

OUTSIDE FACTOR

Latent Conditions

Physical
Environment

PERSONNEL FACTOR

Ruel & Regulations

Cognitive
Factor

Physiological
Factor

Code

Category

a.1
a.2
a.3
a.4
a.5
a.6
a.7
a.8
a.9
a.10
a.11
a.12
a.13
a.14
a.15
a.16
b.1
b.2
b.3
b.4
b.5

Weather
Vessel over-traffic
VTS failures
Obstacle
Inappropriate navigation aid
Poor navigation aid
Inappropriate Notice to Mariner
Mismanagement of waterway
Inappropriate port facilities
Shallow water
Narrow waterway
Strong current
Frozen condition
Drift ice area
Pilot failures
Etc.
Local special navigation regulations
Int’l regulations & Codes
Flag State regulations
Port State regulations
Others

c.1
c.2
c.3
c.4
c.5
c.6
c.7
c.8
c.9
c.10
c.11
c.12
c.13
d.1
d.2
d.3
d.4
d.5

Complacency
Mental fatigue
Nerves
Haste, Flustration
Distration
Negative affectivity
High-self confidence
Low-self confidence
Low work satisfaction
Immoderate reliance on automated system
Personality
Mental disease
Others
Physical fatigue
Physical disease
Alcohol, Drugs
Sight or hearing disability
Body condition
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Personnel
Readiness

ONBOARD FACTOR

Organisation

Technological
Factor

Workplace
Factor

d.6
d.7
d.8
e.1
e.2
e.3
e.4
e.5
e.6
e.7
e.8
e.9

Motor ability
Age, Sex
Others
Inadequate qualification (physical, aptitude, etc.)
Lack of knowledge
Misknowledge
Lack of skills
Estimate of the situation inability
Erroneous assumption, prediction, prejudice
Inappropriate habit
Previous accident experience
Others

f.1
f.2
f.3
f.4
f.5
f.6
f.7
f.8
f.9
f.10
f.11
f.12
f.13
f.14
f.15
g.1
g.2
g.3
g.4
g.5
g.6
g.7
g.8
h.1
h.2
h.3
h.4
h.5
h.6
h.7
h.8
h.9

Inappropriate custom regulation
Organisational pressure (workload, workhour)
Inaccurate responsibility & duty
Aberrant communication
Improper duty handover
Inappropriate placement of human resources
Chilling effect of seafarers
Seafarers interaction
Leadership problem (superior supervision)
Immoderate authoritarianism
Lack of authority
Inappropriate procedure, regulations, instructions
Education-training onboard
Staffing of seafarers (nationality, qualification)
Others
Ship design
Equipment & tool (utility, reliability)
Maintenance check-up
Cargo property
Cargo handling management
Draft (loadage, overload)
Kinds of ship certification
Others
Lighting
Noise
Temperature, humidity
Vibration
Cleanliness
Atmosphere (stench, fumes, gases)
Ergonomic design of work place
Work characteristics
Influence by others in workplace
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ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES

Management/
Supervision

h.10
h.11
h.12
h.13

Absence or misarrangement of equipment
Automation level of ship
Diet suitability
Others

i.1
i.2
i.3
i.4
i.5
i.6
i.7

Boarding inappropriate seafarers
Insufficient management of eligibility of seafarers
Education-training absence
Education-training deficiency
Inappropriate education-training contents
Inappropriate education-training procedure
Insufficient assessment or development of
education-training
Mismanagement of equipment & supplies
Others
Operation tempo
Inappropriate operating system
Inappropriate ship operation plan
Absence of safety culture
Management environment (economic, political,
legal, social condition, etc.)
Budge problem
Inappropriate reward and punishment system
Poor working condition (vacation, shift system)
Hiring policy
Accident emergency countermeasures
Others
Boarding unqualified seafarers
Onboard standards violation
Violate behaviour connivance
Others

i.8
i.9
j.1
j.2
j.3
j.4
j.5

Operation

Violation

j.6
j.7
j.8
j.9
j.10
j.11
k.1
k.2
k.3
k.4
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